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Foreword: Illinois Evidence-The Question of
Codification
HONORABLE JOHN POWERS CROWLEY*
When the editors of the Loyola Law Journal conceived of this
issue exhaustively treating the state of the law of Evidence in Illi-
nois there was some anticipation by the bench and bar that the
Illinois Supreme Court would recommend the adoption of the Illi-
nois Code of Evidence, based, in part, upon the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The supreme court has now acted, or failed to act, by not
taking a position on the Proposed Illinois Code.
As the articles and student notes in this issue of the Journal aptly
demonstrate, certain ambiguities exist within the law of evidence
in Illinois. There are many individuals, familiar with these ambigui-
ties, who are opposed to the codification of the law of evidence,
feeling in the main that codes will stultify the development of the
law and that rulings will be made, not based upon reasoned analysis
of the competing arguments, but upon the strict application of rigid
rules.
I suggest that the practice under the Federal Rules does not sup-
port such negative speculations. On the contrary, the codification
and application of the Rules has produced an awareness of the foun-
dation upon which they are based, and a continuing dialogue on
their application. Indeed, although the Federal Rules contain in-
firmities as are present in any body of law and while they do not
explicitly establish guidelines in many areas, particularly presump-
tions and privileges, the drafters did not attempt to cover all areas
of the law of evidence or to conceive of all possible questions. These
omissions were intended to avoid the rigidity which could interfere
with the development of the law. In those areas where the Rules do
not provide a definitive answer, they do provide the starting point
for the inquiry, thus compelling the practitioner and the judge to
examine the theory behind the rule. Those who deal with the Fed-
eral Rules are compelled to follow Mr. Justice Holmes' teaching:
"Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the
architect is the most important man who takes part in the building
of the house. . . . It is not to be feared as impractical, for, to the
competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject."
* United States District Court Judge, Northern District of Illinois, Associate Professor of
Law, DePaul University, College of Law.
Loyola University Law Journal
The Federal Rules have introduced many long-needed reforms. In
conspiracy cases we are no longer faced with the frightening pros-
pect of having jurors determine the admissibilty of co-conspirators'
statements. That responsibility has been placed squarely upon the
trial judge where it always belonged.
There is a disagreement among various circuits as to the admissi-
bility other acts and occurrences and many aspects of the hearsay
rule are being reexamined in light of the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.
The admissibility of prior convictions to impeach credibility, and
the scope and exercise of the discretion of the trial court, as well as
the standard applicable to the introduction of other acts to support
an inference other than propensity have received critical analysis in
recent opinions.
Indeed, practically every aspect of the Federal Rules has been
considered by the Courts since their implementation. If there is any
lesson to be learned from their use it is that to a great extent they
are general rather than specific and serve as a guide rather than as
restrictive dogma. The rules encourage the exercise of sound judg-
ment while at the same time allowing litigating parties to plan their
action with these guides in mind, rather than requiring them to
wander through a maze of often inconsistent rulings.
In the absence of codification in Illinois, this issue of the Law
Journal with its excellent analysis of varied evidentiary problems
and principles may cause us all, and particularly Illinois lawyers
and judges, to take to heart Dean Wigmore's admonition of 1904:
If we are to save the law for a living future, if it is to remain
manageable amidst the sprawling mass of rulings and statutes
which stand increasingly to clog its simplicity, we must rescue
these meanings from forgetfulness.
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